Civil service and military pensions in India by Sane, Renuka & Shah, Ajay
Hitotsubashi University Repository
TitleCivil service and military pensions in India













This paper describes the New Pension System (NPS), an individ-
ual account dened contribution pension scheme introduced for civil
servants in India, and the problems faced in implementation of this
system. We describe what has been achieved in the implementation
of the NPS, and the challenges ahead. We also document the state of
military pensions which have not been a part of the reform process.
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Unlike many parts of the world, where population-wide systems lead the
pension reform process, in India, civil services pension reform came rst.
New recruits, who were traditionally given a dened benet civil servants
pension, were placed into a dened-contribution individual account system
called the New Pension System (NPS) from January 2004. By and large,
this has been implemented in all parts of government except for three state
governments, and the armed forces.
Under the NPS, employees contribute 10% of their salary, matched by a 10%
contribution from the employer into pension funds managed by professional
fund managers. Withdrawals are allowed from the age of retirement cur-
rently set at 60, with a requirement that 40% of the accumulated balance be
annuitised.
Civil service pensions, along with occupational pensions administered by the
Employees Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO), are the only formal-sector
pension programs in India. These two programs cover about 12% of the
workforce. Expenditure on civil service pensions, prior to the reform, was
2.31% of GDP in 2004-05 (Shah, 2006) and by one estimate, the implicit
pension debt had reached 55.8% of GDP (Bhardwaj and Dave, 2005). High
expenditures and low coverage were part of the motivation for the genesis of
reform that is now underway.
The reform is signicant because it has moved beyond parametric changes
to the existing dened-benet arrangement (for civil servants). At the same
time, the institutional arrangements of the NPS are scalable beyond civil
servants. Others in the economy can also become part of the NPS. Ulti-
mately, all citizens of India should be able to open an individual account
with the NPS, and carry that account with them through their labour-force
trajectory, across jobs, sectors and locations. Employers should be able to
make contributions (apart from the mandatory EPFO contributions) to their
employees accounts as well as governments wanting to run co-contribution
schemes for the poor.
At the time of writing, this process has begun for employees of the central
government and almost all state governments. The NPS has also been made
available to citizens of India on a voluntary basis. Occupational pensions
remain with the EPFO.
The NPS architecture is in place. The Pension Fund Regulatory & Devel-
opment Authority (PFRDA) functions as an arm of the Ministry of Finance
3and has the mandate of regulation and development of the pensions sector in
India (albeit without the full legal powers of a nancial regulator). A record-
keeping agency has been appointed, which interfaces with the accounting
infrastructure of the central government, and consolidates all contribution in-
formation. It reconciles this information with actual funds held in a Trustee
Bank. The agency then passes this to the pension fund managers whose sole
task is to invest the funds. Several state governments are in the process of
plugging into the NPS architecture. The PFRDA has also appointed agen-
cies such as banks to serve as the interface between NPS customers outside
of the government and the record-keeping agency.
While the NPS has made several achievements, these have come about at a
very slow pace, and the implementation of the NPS continues to be plagued
by delays. Political constraints have held up the legislation which would give
the PFRDA powers of nancial regulation. Several state government payroll
processes have not yet been integrated with the NPS architecture. Invest-
ment guidelines continue to suer from weaknesses on access to domestic
and overseas equity investment. Voluntary participation from the unorgan-
ised sector has, as yet, been minimal.
Despite these weaknesses, the NPS is a ne example of a low-cost, scalable,
commoditised fund management system. With about 1.1 million partici-
pants, the NPS is a large system by world standards, even though it is a
small system by Indian standards. The ideas and the institutional apparatus
of the NPS could well play a role in the future reforms of the EPFO.
The NPS comprehensively changed the terms of employment of new recruits
into the civil service in almost all parts of government. Pensions for the
armed forces, however, have been left unmodied.
This paper is an attempt to describe the New Pension System in India, and
the progress that has been made since its introduction in 2004. It then iden-
ties the challenges ahead. It also documents the state of military pensions
which have not been part of the reform process.
Section 2 describes the old pension system and the rationale for reform. In
section 3 the design of the NPS is explained brie
y. Section 4 talks about
the various implementation legs of the NPS and the progress that has been
achieved. Military pensions are described in section 5 and the way forward
for the NPS is discussed in section 6.





Vesting 20 years or 10 years if at the end of service
Benet Monthly pension
Commutation Provision Forgo 40% of the pension and take it as lump sum
Restored after 15 years of retirement
Max Benet Rate 50% of wages in the last ten months of employment
Survivor benet 30% of the monthly pension
Indexation arrangement CPI
2 Traditional civil servants pension (TCSP)
The most important element of the traditional civil servants pension (TCSP)
is an unfunded pay-as-you-go dened benet pension given to employees of
the Central Government.
The benet is roughly half of the basic pay in the last ten months of employ-
ment, computed at around 1/60 for each year of service, subject to a benet
rate cap at 50 per cent.1 Employees are eligible for benets after 10 years
of service and get the full benet upon completion of 33 years in service. In
addition, the pension promises a survivor benet, though the benet drops
to 30% and is given till the death of the spouse. A brief description of the
TCSP is presented in Table 1.
State governments in India also have dened-benet programs substantially
like the TCSP at the Center, and have been under severe scal pressure given
their large workforce.
In addition, employees of organisations which are government undertakings
are part of the \Central Provident Fund" or the \Government Provident
Fund". Both these pay an administered rate of return on contributions, and
allow for early withdrawals. Even though they are called provident funds,
there is no separate fund and benets are paid out of the Consolidated Fund
of India. These are thus pay-as-you-go programs, but are free of longevity
risk. In addition, the size of the payments involved is small. Hence, these
problems are of second order when compared with the TCSP.
Civil services salaries are revised every few years by a \Pay Commission"
1A 'commutation provision' allows employees to forgo 40% of the pension amount and
take it as a lump sum at the time of retirement.
5constituted by the Government of India. This implies that the basic salary
of all government employees goes through a hike once every few years. Pay
Commissions are also known to increase the pension payments made to ex-
isting pensioners; to this extent, the traditional civil servants pension has a
wage indexation over and beyond the linkage to the terminal wage.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the size of government expanded rapidly. In this
period, payments on the dened benet pension appeared to be small when
compared with the wage bill. From the early 1990s onwards, the headcount
of civil servants started declining, re
ecting both the austerity measures
adopted after the IMF Program in 1991, and a new economic policy phi-
losophy which emphasised a small State. Pension payments to the recruits
of the previous decades then started looming large.2
The 2009-10 budget estimated a total out
ow of Rs.484 billion (approxi-
mately US$10 billion or 1% of GDP) on pensions and retirement benets of
central government employees (GoI, 2009b). State government expenditure
on pensions stood at Rs.1003.5 billion3 (approximately US$22.5 billion) in
2009-10 (RBI, 2010). The out
ows are expected to rise as the cohort of hires
between the 70s and 90s retires.
Bhardwaj and Dave (2005) estimated that the implicit pension debt on ac-
count of the civil service pension worked out to roughly 56 per cent of GDP,
under fairly conservative assumptions. Thus, even though civil servants made
up only 6-10% of the paid workforce (Bhardwaj and Dave, 2005; Garg and
Bhardwaj, 2009), their pension provisions were proving to be extremely ex-
pensive. It was therefore felt that the country was spending a disproportion-
ate amount of money on a small set of the population, which was relatively
better o to begin with.
3 The NPS: Design
In this backdrop of low coverage and scal stress, it was felt that reform to
a DC system was the way forward.4
India chose to go with an unbundled architecture where the process of selling,
record-keeping and fund management would be managed by dierent entities
2They stood at 2.31% of GDP in 2004-05, the year of the reform.
3This also includes expenditure on miscellaneous general services.
4See Shah (2006) for a description of the goals of pension reform in India.
































































































for reasons of administrative and cost eciency (Dave, 2000). The NPS
consists of the following key participants (See Figure 1):
Points of Presence (POPs) POPs are the access point to the NPS for
all customers. The existing network of banks, post-oces, depository
participants is used for this function. In the case of civil servants,
the existing administrative framework that disburses salaries and other
benets functions as the POPs.
Central Record-keeping Agency (CRA) The CRA is the central agency
that is connected to the many POPs spread across the country at one
end, and to the fund managers managing the investments on the other.
Every day, it calculates and transmits the net value of funds that need
to 
ow to the fund manager.
Pension Fund Managers (PFMs) PFMs purely focus on fund manage-
ment. They receive a single instruction and funds transfer from the
CRA, every day, and this drives their assets under management.
Regulator This process is supervised by an independent regulator.
74 The NPS: Implementation
In 2002, the central government made the decision to phase in the New
Pension System by placing all new recruits from 1 January 2004 onwards into
the NPS. The NPS requires a 10% contribution rate by the employee and a
10% contribution rate by the government (as the employer). The phasing in
of the NPS for new recruits was thus, in eect, accompanied by a 10 per cent
wage hike for the new recruits. This large value for the contribution rate { of
20 per cent { was chosen by the political leadership in order to ensure that
even if a worker only invested in government bonds, the NPS would generally
replicate the benets of the TCSP.
High GDP growth meant that the government would be able to shoulder
the burden of paying benets for the older civil servants under the TCSP,
and paying contributions for the new civil servants under the NPS. Because
no benets were taken away from existing civil servants, and any change in
the promises amounted to a change in the employment contract given to a
new recruit, there was essentially no opposition from the trade unions to the
reform. In addition, there was no population-wide legacy system to begin
with. Hence, the political environment surrounding the introduction of the
NPS was unusually benign.
However, the NPS implementation fell into stasis when the government that
took the decision of implementing the reform lost the general election of
2004, and the new government leaned heavily on leftist parties for political
support, who were opposed to the new system.5
4.1 Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Au-
thority (PFRDA)
The Department of Economic Aairs (DEA) at the Ministry of Finance in
India, notied of a new pensions regulator in August 2003, before the NPS
commenced operations in January 2004. The PFRDA bill was lodged in
Parliament in 2005, and at the time of writing, is still awaiting approval.
As the NPS had already become operational for government employees,
it would have been dicult to enter into agreements with various service
providers without a body overseeing the process. In the absence of the legisla-
tion, the legal strategy adopted was to setup a network of contracts, between
5Dave (2006) provides a detailed account of the odyssey of the NPS.
8the government and the array of service providers (e.g. pension fund man-
ager, point of presence, etc). Supervisory functions would then be exercised
under contract law. The Government therefore established the PFRDA to
play such a development and supervision role, through an executive order.6
As the PFRDA functions as an arm of the Ministry of Finance, its role as
a regulator is relatively limited when compared with a full blown statutory
regulator such as SEBI.7 In recent years, the PFRDA has performed the
following functions:
1. Selected a Central Record-keeping Agency (CRA) through a competi-
tive process.
2. Selected Pension Fund Managers (PFMs) through a competitive pro-
cess.
3. Set up a Trust called the NPS Trust under the Indian Trusts Act, 1882
to oversee the functions of the PFMs.
4. Appointed a Custodian.
5. Appointed a Trustee Bank to facilitate 
ow of funds between the central
government and the CRA.
6. Opened up the NPS to the informal sector, and launched a group-based
scheme, which allows poor workers to contribute as a group, called the
NPS Lite. In addition, it has also launched a co-contribution scheme
called the Swavalamban Scheme which grants an incentive of Rs.1000
to accounts opened by people in the unorganised sector.
The NPS architecture as has been implemented is presented in Figure 2.
4.2 Membership
The NPS has a captive population of new recruits to the civil services. In
June 2010 the NPS was operational in all accounting formations of Central
Governments, and 117 Central Autonomous Bodies (CABs). In addition, 22
State Governments are in the process of integrating with the NPS.8
6See http://www.pfrda.org.in/
7SEBI is the equities market regulator in India.
8For details on notications made by the state governments to this eect, refer to
http://www.pfrda.org.in/index2.asp?sublinkid=62
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As of November 2010, the NPS had 1.1 million members. It is believed that
the central and state governments have not been able to capture information
about all new recruits, thereby leading to under-enrolment in the NPS.
4.3 Central Record-keeping Agency (CRA)
The National Securities Depository Limited (NSDL) was appointed as CRA
on April 10, 2007 through a competitive bidding process based on technical
and commercial criteria. NSDL is the largest depository in the country and
also the agency which successfully built and implemented the Tax Informa-
tion Network (TIN)9 between 2004 and 2005.
The CRA became operational on 1st June 2008, and was inaugurated on 29th
August 2008. The CRA operationalisation has required no capital investment
by the Government of India. The service charge model of the CRA is on
the basis of number of investors and transactions and not on the value of
transactions as is the case for most other nancial intermediaries. NSDL
has committed to reducing charges as and when the number of subscribers
9TIN was envisaged to integrate primary information of tax payments in designated
banks, tax deduction at source and information on high value transactions.





ow of participant information and money to the CRA hap-
pens through the accounting system prevalent at the central government
level. This accounting infrastructure consists of the Principal Accounts Of-
ce (PrAO), Pay and Accounts Oce (PAO) and the Drawing and Disburs-
ing Ocer (DDOs). In addition, the CRA has set up several facilitation
centers (CRA-FC) to provide services to the nodal ocers or ocers under
the Central and State Governments.
This contribution 
ow had to go through in two phases:
 The interim phase, before the CRA became operational (2004-2008).
 After the CRA became operational (2008 onwards).
The interim phase required the Central Pension Accounts Oce (CPAO)
to keep note of the new employees and their notional account information.
Once the CRA was operationalised, this information needed to be ported
to the new CRA. One of the early challenges of the reform process was the
integration of the accounting infrastructure and the interim measure, to the
CRA.
The information 
ow after operationalisation has been made possible by
designating Nodal Oces from the existing PAOs and DDOs, which interact
with the CRA. These Nodal Oces are responsible for uploading subscriber
information to the CRA. The upload of each le is made possible by the use
of the NPS Contribution Accounting Network (NPSCAN)10, a web based
application developed by the CRA for uploading contribution les, and other
subscriber information to the CRA.
The process is as follows:
1. The Drawing and Disbursing Ocers interact with the employees and
certify the employment details, and consolidate the employees contri-
bution details. They also make note of the 10% employee contribution
and 10% government contribution and pass on all the information to
the Pay and Accounts Oce. They distribute the unique id's gener-
ated by the CRA to the employees. The DDOs are also responsible
10https://npscan-cra.com/CRA/
11for forwarding any requests by the employees to switch to a dierent
pension fund, or to change their own details.
2. The Pay and Accounts Oce consolidates the details from all the o-
cers under it, and uploads the subscriber information le to the CRA.
This generates the Permanent Retirement Account Number (PRAN)
for each employee. The PAO also deposits the contribution amount to
the Trustee Bank (discussed in section 4.6). This oce is thus respon-
sible for the information 
ow to the CRA and for the 
ow of funds to
the Trustee Bank which then reconciles the information with the CRA
before the proceeds are transferred to the pension funds for investment.
3. The functioning of these two legs of the accounting system is overseen
by the Principal Accounts Oce.
4.5 Pension Fund Managers (PFMs)
The PFMs were also selected by the PFRDA through a process of com-
petitive bidding, based on technical capabilities and costs. To assuage the
ideological opposition from the left parties, bids were initially invited only
from public sector rms for sponsoring the pension funds. To be eligible, the
sponsors were, inter alia, required to have at least 5 years experience of fund
management, with average assets under management of not less than Rs.100
billion (about US$2.2 billion) for the month of March 2007.11
An independent committee evaluated the interests received from seven en-
tities and selected three of them. Subsequently, four other fund managers
were appointed to the system and include private sector entities. These are
allowed to manage the contributions coming from voluntary members.
The three public sector entities which manage the funds of government em-
ployees have provided a weighted average return of 11.88% between 2008-
2010, and the AUM as of December 2010 was around US$1.6 billion.12 The
pension funds have in reality been restricted to making very conservative
investments. The approved investment pattern is presented in Table 2.
Thus, the guidelines cap equity exposure at 15% and are heavily reliant on
government debt which typically pays very low returns. They also allow for
no international exposure. Equity investment is required to be done through
11http://www.pfrda.org.in/indexmain.asp?linkid=174
12Source: PFRDA
12Table 2 Approved Investment Pattern
Instrument Prescribed limit
Government Securities Upto 55%
(Central & State )
Corporate Bonds Upto 40%
(PSU, Private corporate debt & Fixed deposit)
Money market instruments Upto 5%
(Includes units of money market mutual funds)
Equity and equity related mutual funds Upto 15%
index funds. The pension fund chooses the index it intends to track in
advance on a yearly basis.
The default scheme termed \Scheme of various Pension Fund Managers"
allows 85% of the contributions to be invested in xed income instruments,
and 15% in equity related instruments.13
For non-government subscribers the default life cycle fund adopts an auto-
matic fund allocation between equity, corporate debt and government bonds
linked to the age of the investor. The asset allocation ratio is xed between
age 18 to 35. The proportion between equity:corporate debt:government
bonds is 50:30:20. Beyond age 36, assets allocated in equity and corporate
debt reduce by 2% and 1% respectively, every year. Simultaneously, the asset
allocation in government bonds increases by 3% every year.
The initial design of NPS allowed members the 
exibility to choose amongst
the pension funds. However, this feature has still not been made available
to civil servants. Fund allocation to the three funds was initially made on
the basis of the fees quoted by them, and subsequently based on their over-
all performance. Members outside of the civil services do have a choice of
investment.
4.6 Trustee Bank and Custodian
Bank of India (BoI), a public-sector bank, has been appointed as the trustee
bank to handle the funds. The Government of India (GoI) transfers money




13The Stock Holding Corporation of India has been given the mandate to act
as custodian of the investment instruments.
4.7 NPS Trust
PFRDA set up a Trust under the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 called the NPS
Trust on 24th April 2007. The NPS Trust has been set up in the interest of
the beneciaries and is responsible for oversight on the assets and funds under
management. In accordance with the Trust Deed, the trustees supervise the
PFMs, and interact with the other participants in the pension system: the
CRA, Trustee Bank and others.
4.8 Withdrawal and tax policies
The NPS is subject to the EET tax framework. Income of the NPS Trust
is exempted from income tax, and any dividend paid is exempt from the
dividend distribution tax. NPS Trust transactions on the equity and deriva-
tive markets are also exempt from the securities transaction tax. In order
to encourage voluntary contribution to the NPS, self employed persons have
also been allowed to avail of tax benets (GoI, 2009a).
At the time of retirement, it is envisaged that members will be able to take
60% of the accumulation as a lump sum, while 40% will have to be mandato-
rily annuitised by buying an annuity from a service provider in the market.
Annuity service providers have not yet been appointed. No government guar-
antee has been envisaged, but there might be a provision for private sector
providers to sell appropriately priced guaranteed products.
4.9 Costs
The NPS design was motivated by the desire to operate a low-cost pension
system. Table 3 provides the costs of the NPS.
These charges have shaped up as amongst the lowest in the world, thus
validating key elements of the original conception of the NPS.
14Table 3 NPS charges
Service charges
Head in Rs. in US$
Central Record-keeping Agency
Account Opening 50 1.12
Annual maintenance 280 6.3
Charge per transaction 6 0.14
Points of Presence
Initial subscriber registration
& contribution upload 40 0.90
Any subsequent transaction 20 0.45
Trustee Bank
Transaction from a RBI location 0 0
Transaction from a non-RBI location 15 0.34
Custodian
Asset servicing charges
Electronic segment 0.0075% p.a
Physical segment 0.05% p.a.
Pension Fund Management
Investment Management Fee 0.0009% p.a.
Source: PFRDA
5 Military pensions
5.1 Overview of scheme benets
Armed force personnel are members of a dened-benet, PAYG scheme -
nanced by the Government of India.
The pension for commissioned ocers is calculated at 50% of the average
reckonable emoluments drawn during the last 10 months. For Personnel Be-
low Ocers Rank (PBOR), it is calculated with reference to the maximum
of the scale of pay of the rank and group held for 10 months preceding re-
tirement. Since April 2004, the minimum pension is deemed to be Rs.1913
(US$44) per month and the maximum is upto 50% of the highest pay appli-
cable to Armed Forces personnel.14
14http://mod.nic.in/welfareschemes/welcome.html
15Ocers need to be in service for 20 years before being eligible to claim the
pension. For the PBOR the minimum required years of service is 15 years.
Thus, for ocers who join the army at age 18, pension promises are payable
from age 38 onwards, for life. This implies that the NPV of lifetime benets
is very large. In contrast, a civil servant retiring at age 38 is not eligible for
similar benets.
In addition, armed forces personnel are permitted higher commutation of
their pension at the rate of 43% for ocers and 45% for PBOR as compared
to 40% for civilians.
In case of death during service or after retirement, a family pension is paid
to the dependents at a uniform rate of 30% of reckonable emoluments last
drawn subject to a minimum of Rs.1913 (US$44) per month. Those military
personnel who leave service and get reemployed in the civil sector, can join
the EPFO schemes while continuing to be eligible for the military family
pension.
In addition, there are several provisions for disability and war injury pensions.
Total expenditure on military pensions in 2010-11 was about 0.3% of GDP.
It is important to note that this expenditure is made on a very small segment
of the country's population.15
5.2 Issues in military pension reform
The transition from a DB to a DC pension for military personnel is compli-
cated on account of the low service tenure. In the case of the NPS for civil
servants, the political bargain was one where employees got a 10% raise, and
then contributed 20%, in return for losing the DB pension. If a comparable
bargain has to be struck for the military pension, it would have to involve
rather dierent parameters, as the contribution rate required to replace the
NPV of benets payable from as early as age 38 would be very high.
The process of military pension reform now involves (a) Undertaking tech-
nical studies about alternative rules for transition, (b) Educating soldiers
about the trade-o that is being made and (c) Undertaking consultations
with the chiefs of sta.
The portability of a DC pension account is advantageous for relatively skilled
15In 2007, the number of defence pensioners were estimated to be around 2.2 million.
See http://mod.nic.in/welfareschemes/welcome.html.
16people in the armed forces, who are able to transition into the private labour
market after leaving the armed forces. However, for the more junior soldiers,
this factor (portability) does not make a substantial dierence. For them,
the two choices would have to have a comparable NPV.
6 NPS: Lessons learned and the way forward
When a wave of pension reform swept the world, with a movement from
DB to DC systems, at rst there was an emphasis on privatisation, on re-
moving pensions from the realm of public nance. After some experience
built up with the diculties of the early systems, the second wave of re-
formers placed a signicant accent upon delivering a low-cost system which
delivered strong results to the end customers of the pension system. India's
New Pension System, which was planned in the late 1990s, represents such
a second-generation pension system design.
By and large, the NPS has delivered on its promise as a low-cost civil service
pension system. The key disappointment of the NPS has been the slow
pace at which the system implementation came about. On paper, there was
a decision that all new recruits of the central government after 1/1/2004
would be in the NPS. However, in practice, there were considerable delays
in the process of connecting up the pay oces spread across the country to
the NPS.
By early 2010, however, a considerable mass of members and assets under
management had built up in the NPS. We list below areas of concern re-
garding NPS implementation which need to be addressed before the system
comes up to the full functionality that was originally envisaged.
6.1 Streamlining government payroll processes
One of the key disappointments of the NPS has been the haphazard inte-
gration of the government payroll process into the CRA. This is particularly
bad in the case of state governments. Garg and Bhardwaj (2009) provide
detailed recommendations for the creation of employee and pension related
databases so as to be able to streamline the process of payment of salaries,
as well as pension deductions.
Another key eort in this regard is an NPS evaluation report submitted by
the Technology Advisory Group for Unique Projects (TAGUP) constituted
17by the Ministry of Finance. TAGUP (2011) has recommended:
 Enabling linkages with HR and payroll systems of the Central and State
Governments to obtain subscriber contribution details.
 Providing process linking between Government accounting systems and
the pensions administration system.
Both these recommendations need to be taken on board by the PFRDA
and the central and state governments to enable the complete integration of
government employees into the NPS.
6.2 Establishing transparency
PFRDA has, so far, had limited transparency about the NPS. There is a
great need for dissemination of daily statistics about the number of mem-
bers, assets under management, performance of all fund managers in all as-
set classes, summary statistics about performance of members, information
about switching across fund managers and across asset classes by members,
and the returns drag introduced by fees and expenses. This data will enable
better analysis about how the NPS is faring, and modication of policy po-
sitions. The importance of a daily MIS about these facts was also made by
(TAGUP, 2011).
6.3 Investment choice
NPS oers no 
exibility to the government employee in terms of access to
various asset classes or international diversication. This needs to be replaced
by an environment where NPS members are able to choose how their assets
are placed across domestic and overseas assets, and across the three major
asset classes: equity, corporate bonds and government bonds. In each of
these areas, NPS members need to be able to choose between multiple fund
managers. The NPS `default option' which is a life cycle fund available only
to members outside of civil services needs to be extended to everyone.
6.4 Draw-down phase
The NPS mandates that 40% of the accumulations be used to purchase an
annuity and stipulates 60 to be the retirement age.
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for the entire population are not well developed. Increasing life expectancy
may mean that the age of 60 also needs to get revised upwards over the
years. Also, while age 60 has worked as the retirement age for those in
the civil services and the organised sector, little is known about retirement
decisions of those in the informal sector.
As the NPS is still in its early stages, there are many years before the rst
cohort of NPS entrants retires. However, the PFRDA needs to focus on
tackling these issues and be prepared with policies for the time when people
start retiring out of the NPS.
6.5 Extensions of the NPS
Extension: Voluntary participation by older civil servants
Now that the basic NPS is in place, there is a role for government to give
an option to older civil servants { e.g. those who joined before 1/1/1994 {
to switch away from the TCSP to the NPS. This would involve oering an
initial endowment into their NPS account, to re
ect the pension rights that
they would step away from. Through this, the benets of the NPS would
become available to more individuals and the economies of scale of the NPS
would build up.
Extension: Armed forces
One large group of civil servants - the uniformed armed forces - has remained
outside the NPS. Now that the basic structure of the NPS is in place, gov-
ernment needs to bring new recruits into the armed forces also into the NPS.
The contribution rate for these employees must of course be fairly dierent
from those used for all others, given the low age at which most soldiers retire.
Extension: Employers outside the government
Firms with 20 or more employees are covered by the EPFO. However, there
are a large number of rms with fewer than 20 employees who remain uncov-
ered by any kind of a pension scheme. As well, rms under the EPFO often
make additional contributions for their employees as part of the HR policy
to attract good sta. The NPS could be extended to such employers, with
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could also get tax-favoured status such that the NPS moves closer towards
the ideal of becoming a portable pension system for all. The Union Bud-
get of 2011-12 has made recommendations for permitting tax-deductions of
employer contributions to the NPS. This is a step in the right direction.
Extension: Individual membership
One of the key problems in the NPS has been the low individual member-
ship outside of the civil services. This has been seen to be caused by poor
incentives for selling the NPS, as opposed to high fees paid by mutual funds
and insurance companies for the sale of their products. As a consequence,
PFRDA has started thinking about individuals outside of the civil services
adopting the NPS as an alternative to mutual funds or insurance companies,
and has started moving towards the agent-driven sales model that is in use
with mutual funds or insurance companies. Going further down this path
would lose the essence of the NPS, which is a low-cost commoditised fund
management mechanism. Instead, more eort needs to be put on innova-
tive sales models that would keep the design of the NPS while encouraging
individual members to open NPS accounts.
6.6 Diculties of existing eorts of NPS for low-income
workers
An unfortunate feature of the recent years has been an eort by the PFRDA
to launch a modied version of the NPS for voluntary adoption by low-income
workers in the informal sector (where there are no mandatory pension pro-
grams). A separate NPS-like pension system has been created and portability
between the two systems has not been assured. Portability is a critical fea-
ture of the NPS design, and compromising on it will dilute the essence of
the system. The creation of a separate system also implies that economies
of scale would not be obtained in both areas.
There has also been a push towards establishing co-contribution schemes
(such as the Swavalamban initiative), and giving out licences to groups which
will collect small-valued contributions from low-income individuals in their
group, and connect to the NPS. While utilising groups is an interesting way
to reach out to those whose contribution size is very low, the focus needs
to shift from mere achieving of a target enrolment in the NPS to ensuring
20that the system of contributions over long-horizons is well understood by the
participants.
It is important for the PFRDA to bear in mind that the NPS is primarily a
system for pension provision, and the focus on long-term savings to provide
for old-age should not be diverted by allowing for early withdrawals and other
such measures. Poverty in working life, or contingency claims such as health
insurance cannot and should not be solved using the NPS. Looking forward,
it is also important to merge all the dierent strands into a single NPS so as
to harness the benets of simplicity and scale economies.
6.7 The core function of the NPS
The most important role that the NPS can play in India is that of being
a supremely ecient and well-functioning individual account DC pension
system.
PFRDA is now the arena of a political economy problem. Financial rms
have an incentive to lobby PFRDA, while NPS participants have no voice.
Financial rms are keen to get back to high charges, to revert from an unbun-
dled architecture to a monolithic architecture, and to ideally go back from a
DC system to a monolithic DB system run by insurance companies.
The governance challenge that India now faces is that of keeping NPS on
track, of keeping NPS close to the original design and vision. NPS needs to
get up to world class in terms of service delivery and low cost. This requires
clarity and commitment on the part of PFRDA, to stay in tune with the
original goals of NPS, and not respond to the lobbying of nancial rms.
If NPS is able to achieve its goals, it will help directly in achieving a healthy
Indian economy, by solving the important problem of the civil servants pen-
sion. It will also help indirectly, by being a role model for the reform of
the mandatory pension system for private rms, which is presently run by
EPFO in unsatisfactory fashion. Alongside these two main goals, there are
many smaller situations where the NPS could naturally be a tool of choice
for addressing policy problems in the eld of pensions.
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